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SECRECY AND DISHONESTY: THE 
SUPREME COURT, RACIAL 
PREFERENCES, AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
Abigail Thernstrom* 
Stephan Thernstrom ** 
One should never count on the U.S. Supreme Court to think 
and write clearly-or even to tell the whole truth and nothing 
but. Its most famous decisions involving racial equality in the last 
half century, starting with Brown v. Board of Education,1 are, to 
put it delicately, a mess. Brown barely qualified as constitutional 
reasoning, although the bottom line was certainly right. In The 
University of California v. Bakke2 the Court turned what should 
have been an easy question into an agonizing one, the result be-
ing a dizzying six different opinions. And the majority opinions 
in Gratz v. Bollinge,J and Grutter v. Bolinger4 managed to wade 
deeper into the constitutional muck, although that hardly 
seemed possible beforehand. 
Maybe the Court in Brown could not have done better than 
it did-given the need for unanimity-but Chief Justice Earl 
Warren's opinion is certainly thin, flimsy, and frustrating. The 
Fourteenth Amendment is almost missing in action. The Court 
relied instead on "psychological knowledge" -mainly the flawed 
self-esteem research of Dr. Kenneth Clark. And the decision re-
affirmed the central holding in Plessy v. Ferguson5 -namely, that 
it was up to judges to weigh (by often unclear standards) the 
costs and benefits of policies that engage in the racial sorting of 
American citizens. Racial classifications were not prohibited. 
• Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, New York; Commissioner, U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights. 
•• Winthrop Professor o[ History, Harvard University. 
I. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
4. 539 u.s. 306 (2003). 
5. 163 u.s. 537 {1896). 
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Every constitutional law textbook contains some reference to 
the soaring rhetoric of Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in 
Plessy, but that dissent was the radical moral vision of a man 
who has remained a voice in the constitutional wilderness.6 
Justice Lewis Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke-an opin-
ion in which four other Justices joined only in part-depicted the 
Court's role as discerning principles, noted that racial classifica-
tions must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, "7 and then labeled a "diverse student body"8 as 
an aim that met the "compelling" interest standard. Racial quo-
tas, however, were unacceptable. In its quest for "diversity," a 
school could use racial identity only as a "plus" factor,9 one con-
sideration among many. And while Justice Brennan (joined by 
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued that "race-
conscious action" 10 was required to remedy "the lingering effects 
of past societal discrimination," 11 Powell rejected that "amor-
phous_concept of in~~ry," which, he said, "may be ageless in its 
reach mto the past." -
"Diversity" was evidently more precise or more principled, 
in Powell's view. But no other Justice signed on to his reasoning. 
Five Justices (Powell plus the Brennan four) did agree, however, 
that both the Constitution and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act permitted race-conscious policies-benefits and burdens at-
tached to individuals on the basis of the color of their skin. 
Allan Bakke won, the University of California lost, and yet 
the decision gave constitutional legitimacy to preferential admis-
sions policies. The Court had drawn an allegedly principled line 
between the permissible (race as a "plus" factor) and impermis-
sible (race as decisive) that was meaningless in practice. If race 
was in the mix, then race was inevitably decisive. Michael Kins-
ley has put the point well. "Admission to a prestige institu-
tion ... ," he has written, "is what computer types call a "binary" 
decision. It's yes or no. You're in or you're out. ... The effect of 
any factor in that decision is also binary. It either changes the re-
6. This is the central argument in ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND 
CONSTITUTION (1992). 
7. 438 U.S. at 299. 
8. /d. at 306. 
9. /d. at317. 
I 0. /d. at 336. 
11. /d. at 352. That phrase, or slight variations on it, is used repeatedly in the Bren-
nan opinion. 
12. /d. at 307. 
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sult or it doesn't. It makes all the difference or it makes none at 
all. Those are the only possibilities." 13 
Powell's diversity rationale allowed race to make "all the 
difference." And thus, twenty-five years later in Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, the Court was once again confronted with the problem of 
race-driven admissions- precisely the admissions process that 
Powell had found unacceptable. For all the trouble to which the 
Bakke Court went, with Justices crafting intricate opinions that 
amounted to a riot of constitutional confusion, those off the 
bench, sifting through applications at the University of Michigan 
and elsewhere, read between the lines and understood that five 
Justices had signed on to racial double-standards in the admis-
sions process. Race could be a factor-and thus could change the 
result. Otherwise inadmissible students would become admissi-
ble when racial identity was thrown in the mix. 
I 
The use of race as a decisive factor in admissions at selective 
colleges and universities, however, was kept under wraps. Imitat-
ing Powell's fancy footwork, university administrators, spinning 
the press and inquisitive preference opponents, insisted that 
race-like musical talent and leadership skill-was just one con-
sideration in the search for students who would contribute to a 
rich educational environment. Bits and pieces of evidence sug-
gested otherwise, but facts were hard to come by. 
In 1991, however, Timothy Maguire, working part time in 
the Georgetown registrar's office, discovered that the college 
grades and LSA T scores of blacks admitted to the Georgetown 
Law Center were dramatically lower than those of their white 
peers. 14 Race was not just one of many possible "plus" factors 
being considered by the admissions committee; it was the only 
consideration that could have explained the acceptance of most 
black students. His findings became national news- testimony to 
how successful schools had been in keeping their racially prefer-
ential policies secret. 
Georgetown defenders declared Maguire's findings dis-
torted, and he had no way of further verifying them. 15 But the 
13. Michael Kinsley, Wam Di1·ersity? Think Fuzzy, WASH. POST, June 25, 2003, at 
A23. 
14. See Timothy Maguire. Mv Bow with Affirma!il·e Action, 93 CO~IME:"TARY 50 
(Apr. 1992). 
15. See Anthony T. Pierce et a!., Degrees of Success: IVith Law School, Graduating 
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proverbial cat was out of the bag, and the reality of race-driven 
admissions became indisputable with the Hopwood litigation 
that resulted in the 1996 finding by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that the University of Texas School of Law had engaged 
in racial discrimination against whites; 16 with the fight in Califor-
nia that ended in the passage of Proposition 209, forbidding ra-
cial greferences in the public sector, including higher educa-
tion; 7 with a similar initiative in the state of Washington; 18 and 
with a number of freedom of information lawsuits. Other tanta-
lizing fragments of evidence trickled out, all suggesting that the 
weight given to racial and ethnic considerations was in fact very 
substantial, amounting in most cases to a flagrant double stan-
dard.19 
And then William G. Bowen and Derek Bok's widely read 
and much celebrated book, The Shape of the River/0 came along. 
It was a defense of what the authors called "racially sensitive 
admissions," but their own numbers undermined their argument 
that schools were engaged in nothing more than morally appeal-
ing "sensitivity." Bowen and Bok studied five private schools in-
tensively. Among applicants for admission in 1989 with SAT 
scores from 1200 to 1249, 19% of whites and 60% of blacks were 
admitted; in the next bracket u~ (1250-1299), 24% of whites and 
75% of blacks were accepted. 1 Among applicants with near-
perfect scores (1500 or better), over a third of whites were 
turned down, but every single black got in. Indeed, black stu-
dents with scores of 1200-1249 were nearly as likely to be ac-
Is the Test, WASH. POST, May 8, 1991, at A31. 
16. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
17. CAL. CO:-.!ST. art. I,* 31. 
18. Washington State Civil Rights Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 
Supp. 1999) 
19. The relevant evidence available through the end of 1996 is summarized and 
evaluated in STEPHA:-; THERNSTROYI & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK 
AND WHITE: ONE NATI0:-.1, INDIVISIBLE 386-422 (1997). The best source of more recent 
evidence on the powerful inlluence of race in admission is a series of studies that Robert 
Lerner & Althea K. Nagai have conducted for the Center for Equal Opportunity. See 
Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai, Pervasive Preferences: Racial and Ethnic Discrimina-
tion in Undergraduare Admissions Across the Narion, available al http://www.ceousa.org/ 
multi.html (this study assess the role of race in admissions at 47 public colleges and uni-
versities); Robert Lerner & Althea Nagai, Preferences in Medical Educalion: Racial and 
Ethnic Preferences al Five Public Medical Schools, available al http://www.ceousa.org/ 
pdfs/multimed.pdf (this study assesses the role of race in 5 medical schools). 
20. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CO'-<SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
( 1998). Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflecrions on The Shape of rhe 
River, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1583 (1999). 
21. BowE:-; & BOK, supra note 20, at 27, fig.2.5. 
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cepted at Bowen and Bok's five institutions as whites with scores 
of 1500 or better. Here was a clear picture of race-driven admis-
sions. 
The Shape of the River performed an invaluable service in 
providing hard evidence that the schools themselves had never 
voluntarily made public. The authors were trusted advocates; 
others (outside a tight circle) who tried to explore the issue fur-
ther had no access either to Bowen and Bok's own data or to 
that which admissions offices continued to keep in tightly locked 
files. 22 But the secrecy and deceit surrounding preferences at 
both public and private institutions of higher education was far 
from unique. Preferential policies in employment, contracting, 
and voting rights all involved racial double-standards, crafted 
without public knowledge or consent and sold as providing noth-
ing more than equal opportunity, blacks and whites on a level 
playing field. 
Dishonesty has always been the American coin of the realm 
when it comes to race-from the Declaration of Independence 
to "separate but equal" and beyond. For a brief moment in the 
mid-1960s, when the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act were passed, the country seemed to be embarked on 
a different course. But policies corrupted by a revised form of 
dishonesty were built upon the foundation of these two great 
legislative triumphs. At the center of that dishonesty lay the no-
tion that, with ongoing racial sorting, the nation would move be-
yond race- that old habits would bring new benefits. 
II 
Racial preferences were the form that racial sorting took 
starting in the late 1960s, although they were certainly not what 
the framers of the great legislative triumphs of the civil rights 
22. Although the Mellon Foundation claimed that it would make the data analyzed 
by Bowen and Bok available to other qualified researchers, the remarkable guidelines 
that set forth its policies governing access to this material strongly suggested that no 
scholar with any reservations about racially preferential policies need apply; Andrew W. 
Mellon Foundation, Policies Concerning the College and Beyond Database (Aug. 27, 
1988) (on file with authors). This interpretation was confirmed when the sociologist 
Robert Lerner, a critic of The Shape of the River, presented a well-crafted proposal for 
further analysis of the data Bowen and Bok used to the Mellon Foundation. His request 
was denied. It is clear that the Mellon Foundation is hostile to research that docs not 
yield answers the foundation likes. For further details, sec Stephan Thcrnstrom & Abi-
gail Thernstrom, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: A Review of the Evidence, in 
ONE AMERICA? POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY, THE DILEMMAS OF 
DIVERSITY 169 (Stanley A. Renshon cd., 2001 ). 
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movement had in mind. The two statutes were pure anti-
discrimination laws: open the restaurants on a color-neutral ba-
sis, enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But both were quickly 
and radically rewritten behind closed doors to embrace race-
driven strategies, benefits attached to membership in certain of-
ficially-designated "disadvantaged" groups as defined by race, 
ethnicity, gender, or disability. This larger shift in sensibilities 
with respect to the meaning of nondiscrimination, and the means 
by which it was implemented, is the context in which preferences 
in higher education must be seen. 
The least known of these re-writing stories is that involving 
the Voting Rights Act.23 In 1965 the Voting Rights Act had one 
purpose: black enfranchisement in the Jim Crow South. Its only 
point was equal access to the polls, the opportunity to vote, a 
guarantee of basic Fifteenth Amendment rights. By 1975, how-
ever, the legislation had been amended by a process of adminis-
trative and judicial interpretation, the result of which was federal 
authority to redistribute political power among racial and ethnic 
groups, giving blacks and Hispanics their "fair share" of legisla-
tive seats. The act had become a measure to protect minority 
candidates from white competition, which is precisely the point 
of all preferences in higher education, employment, and con-
tracting. And yet the principles that governed that redistribution 
had never been debated in the public arena. Minority voters 
were never in on the process of radically rewriting the law. Gov-
ernment attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice were the 
main levers of change, and the standards they used in deciding 
the level of protection to which minority candidates were enti-
tled in particular jurisdictions never saw the light of day. In vot-
ing, as in other areas, equal opportunity became equal out-
comes-proportionate racial and ethnic representation, or as 
close to that ideal as the available means made possible. 
The history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is much 
the same. Once again, the initial statutory aim was straightfor-
ward: to ensure fair employment by outlawing intentional dis-
crimination in a variety of settings. On the question of race-
based preferences, the intent of Congress was very clear. No 
color-conscious preferences with the aim of ensuring a racially-
balanced workforce. But that was not how the first compliance 
chief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
23. For a history of the Voting Rights Act, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE 
VOTES COUNT'/ AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987). 
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(EEOC) read the act, and he was in a position to fashion policy 
almost single-handedly-a process that he called "creative ad-
ministration."24 A statute designed to prevent acts of discrimina-
tion was soon transformed into an instrument to maximize the 
hiring of members of minority groups. This was not a develop-
ment to which the public was privy, however. Nor was the shift 
from access to outcomes acknowledged in the pubic arena. 
"Winks, nods, and disguises"25 substituted for honesty in every 
sphere in which racial preferences were instituted. 
Preferences in higher education, then, are but one aspect of 
a larger story. They are variations on a common theme. In every 
sphere, "anti-discrimination" policies came to involve racial sort-
ing, although that rapid transformation in the meaning of equal-
ity was neither demanded nor supported by the public. No grass 
roots organizations were responsible for the initial development 
of these race-conscious strategies. Moreover, those who de-
signed and implemented them shrouded the process in as much 
secrecy as possible and described the policies in the misleading 
language of access and opportunity. Presumably university ad-
ministrators believed in their own programs, and yet they were 
not willing to defend them openly and honestly. Until white 
plaintiffs sued the University of Michigan, almost no one outside 
of the admissions office knew the college had a point system that 
gave black and Hispanic applicants extraordinary protection 
from their white and Asian peers in the competition for admis-
sion.26 
The consequence has been a history of deception that con-
tinues to this day and, most remarkably, has now been sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bolinger, the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School case, decided in June 2003. The 
university deceived the Court in describing its admissions prac-
tices; the Court deceived the American people; and we're stuck, 
indefinitely, with racial preferences in higher education (and ar-
guably in other spheres as well) that depend on dishonesty to 
survive. Such ongoing dishonesty about racial equality perpetu-
ates the corruption surrounding issues of race that has been 
deeply and perniciously embedded in the history of the nation. 
24. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 53 (1971 ). 
25. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
26. The tireless and courageous efforts of one Michigan faculty member, philoso-
pher Carl Cohen, were crucial in finally exposing to the light of day what university ad-
miSSions officers had been doing. See CARL COHDI, NAKED RACIAL PREFERENCES: 
THE CASE AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1995). 
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III 
The University of Michigan was actually a defendant in two 
cases involving racial preferences, both decided by the High 
Court on June 23, 2003. In Grutter, the issue was law school ad-
missions; in Gratz v. Bollinger, plaintiffs challenged the process 
of admitting undergraduates. The college automatically awarded 
20 points-one-fifth of the number needed to guarantee admis-
sion- to every applicant who was a member of an "underrepre-
sented" racial group. In contrast, Michigan residents got a boost 
of only 10 points, and children of alumni received 4. Counselors 
could assign an outstanding essay up to 3 points and an appli-
cant's personal achievement, leadership, or public service was 
worth up to 5 points, while a perfect 1,600 SAT score merited 12 
points. 
This was not the constitutionally legitimate process that Jus-
tice Powell had described in Bakke, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "The critical criteria are often 
individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but 
sometimes associated with it," Powell had said.27 At the Univer-
sity of Michigan's undergraduate college, however, even if a stu-
dent's '"extraordinary artistic talent' rivaled that of Monet or Pi-
casso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points .... "28 But 
an automatic 20 points would be given to the child of a successful 
black physician. The result: race was the "decisive factor for vir-
tually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority ap-
plicant. "29 The system failed the narrow tailoring test. The means 
chosen "to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in 
diversity" were mechanistic and crude, Rehnquist concluded. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor referred to the 
"sharp contrast to the law school's admissions plan, which en-
ables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with re-
spect to the contributions each ap_Elicant is likely to make to the 
diversity of the incoming class." Writing for the majority in 
Grutter, it is the central point she makes. The law school "en-
gages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each appli-
cant's file ... ," she claimed.31 "Unlike the program at issue in 
Gratz v. Bollinger. . . the Law School awards no mechanical, 
27. 438 u.s. 265,324 (1978). 
28. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,273 (2003). 
29. !d. at 247. 
30. /d. at 279. 
31. 539 U.S 306 at 309 (2003). 
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predetermined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."32 
Race was considered as simply one factor among many. The ad-
missions office engaged in a "flexible assessment of applicants' 
1 . d . 1 ,33 ta ents, expenences, an potentia . 
Did she actually believe her own argument? The law school 
clearly trafficked in racial double standards. A white or Asian 
applicant with, say, an LSAT score of 164-165 and a grade-point 
average of 3.25 to 3.49 had only about a 22 percent chance of 
getting in. But precisely the same academic profile guaranteed 
admission for "under-represented" minority students.34 The law 
school's expert, himself, testified that in 2000, 35 percent of 
black and Latino applicants were admitted, but if race were left 
out of the equation, the figure would drop ~own to 10 percent of 
the underrepresented minority applicants.3) 
Moreover, in the later stages of the admissions process, the 
"individual" assessment was reduced to a daily racial head count, 
as Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, noted. The director of 
admissions from 1991 to 1996 monitored reports that tracked ex-
actly where the law school stood in assembling a "critical mass" 
of black and Hispanic students. He generated those daily reports 
because he knew, he said, that the racial make-up of the entering 
class was "something [he] need[ed] to be concerned about .... " 
Those reports, Kennedy observed, were used "to recalibrate the 
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were to 
achieving the Law School's goal of critical mass. "36 Individual 
review had been reduced to racial identity. 
Writing in dissent in Gratz, Justice Souter dismissed 
O'Connor's feeble-almost laughable-attempt to distinguish 
between the law school and undergraduate admissions processes. 
If one considers racial diversity a value, then racial identity in-
creases some applicants' chances for admission, Souter pointed 
out. "Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are assigned some 
values. The college simply does by a numbered scale what the 
law school accomplishes in its 'holistic review' .... "37 He might 
have made an additional point: The law school simply concealed 
32. I d. at 337 
33. /d. at 315. 
34. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732,797 (2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
35. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (citing App. To Pet. For Ccrt. 
223a). 
36. I d. at 392. 
37. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,295 (2003). 
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a race-driven admissions process that involved preferences actu-
ally greater than those given to undergraduate applicants. 38 
As Souter recognized, it's now clear that the Constitution 
only demands dishonesty. Arguably taunting his colleagues in 
the Gratz majority, he confessed to being "tempted to give 
Michigan an extra point of its own for its frankness" -for its ex-
plicit undergraduate point system. "Equal protection," he said, 
"cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones 
who hide the ball. "39 But Souter's playful jab at the majority 
gave the undergraduate admissions program too much credit. As 
the legal analyst Stuart Taylor has pointed out, Michigan's ex-
plicit point system was not frankly acknowledged; it was exposed 
through a freedom-of-information request by a member of the 
faculty, Carl Cohen, and by subsequent litigation.40 The under-
graduate college was "frank" only behind closed doors, which 
left the public no more informed than it was with respect to 
Michigan's law school admissions. 
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsberg did see a difference between 
the "candor" of Gratz and the "camouflage" of Grutter, and de-
clared the latter a futile exercise.41 Bowen and Bok had made 
the same point: "[I]t is very difficult to stop people from finding 
a path toward a goal in which they firmly believe,"42 they wrote, 
and the goal they really believe in is diversity. One way or an-
other, schools would get the racial mix they wanted.43 Of course, 
the Court could bar institutions from "considering race directly 
and forthrightly ... ," they went on to say, but that would likely 
"bring forth ingenious efforts to minimize the consequent loss of 
38. In his dissenting opinion for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Boggs offered the assess-
ment that, for students with the same LSAT scores, minority applicants with high C to 
low B undergraduate averages were admitted at the same rate as majority applicants with 
A averages in college. And among applicants with college GPAs in the A range, minori-
ties with LSAT scores in the 70th percentile were admitted at the same rate as majority 
applicants with LSATs in the 96th percentile or higher. That, he concluded, was an even 
bigger boost than the 20 points the college automatically awarded applicants on the basis 
of skin color. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 796 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
39. 539 U.S. 244,298 (2003). 
40. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ted Kennedy's Excellent Idea: Disclosing Admissions Prefer-
ences, NAT'Ll., at 292 (2004). 
41. 539 U.S. 244 at 304 (2003). 
42. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 288. 
43. Bowen and Bok arc simply reporting the frequently expressed views of adminis-
trators. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Debater's Notes, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE, (Apr. 1, 2003), at 
http:l/www.nationalrevicw.com/clegg/clegg040103.asp (Roger Clegg, general counsel for 
the Center for Equal Opportunity, tells the story of how while debating racial prefer-
ences at Georgetown University, he was introduced by a university official who casually 
announced that the school "will proceed with its affirmative action policies no matter 
what the Supreme Court docs" in the Michigan cases). 
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diversity by adopting seemingly race-neutral policies that [could] 
have a wide variety of other consequences, not all of them be-
nign."44 
If barred from using racial double-standards, Bowen and 
Bok feared, schools might lower admission standards across the 
board. Constrained only by Bakke-and not by any flat prohibi-
tion-the University of Michigan law school simply said one 
thing and did another, which was evidently constitutionally ac-
ceptable. As Justice Kennedy noted, the Court pretended that 
racial classifications still demanded strict scrutiny and then 
averted its gaze in the face of blatant racial sorting, justified by 
the flimsiest of rationales-namely, the need for a "critical mass" 
of black and Hispanic students.45 That need was premised on the 
assumption that such a critical mass brings educational benefits: 
the weakening of racial stereotypes, better preparation for an in-
creasingly diverse workplace and society, the development of 
skills needed in the global marketplace, and the nurturing of the 
nation's future leaders. 
What, however, was a critical mass? The director of admis-
sions gave a helpful definition: "meaningful numbers" or "mean-
ingful representation."46 Other administrators came up with 
slightly more illuminating answers. The law school dean was 
concerned that "underrepresented" minority students not feel 
"isolated."47 In other words, schools need to make sure the 
number of black students is sufficient to allow black student or-
ganizations, black study groups and so forth. And in many col-
leges, that critical mass also allows separate dorms, freshman 
orientations and graduation celebrations. A school's commit-
ment to "diversity" is essential to the self-segregation so preva-
lent in institutions of higher education. 
The Court not only ignored the self-segregation apparent on 
almost every campus, but also substantial social science evidence 
that racial double-standards actually hurt race relations on cam-
puses, heightening stereotypes, increasing racial isolation and 
tension.48 The Court referred to enhanced classroom discussion 
44. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 28'!. 
45. Grul!cr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392 (2003). 
46. !d. at 318. 
47. !d. at 31 '!. 
48. See Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Diversify Distorted: How 1he Universily 
of Michigan Wiihheld Data to Hide Evidence of Racial Conflicl and Polarization (May 27, 
2003), ami/able a1 hl!p:l/www.ceousa.org/pdfs/hiddendata.pdf (in this paper the authors 
offer a probing analysis of data gathered by the University of Michigan itself but ignored 
In the testimony proffered by its chief social science witness, Dr. Patricia Gurin). For cvi-
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as a consequence of diversity, and the actual weakening of racial 
stereotypes when "nonminority students learn there is no 'mi-
nority viewpoint,"' although O'Connor presented no survey data 
suggesting such a benefit. 
But as Peter Kirsanow, commissioner on the U.S. Commis-
sion for Civil Rights, says, the point makes perfect sense. What 
minority student would want to sit in a class as spokesperson for 
his or her race. "[W]ho would want the burden of presenting the 
Hispanic stance on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle? Or the 
Native-American perspective on gradient derivatives? Or even 
the black position on Gilgamesh? And imagine the clash of cul-
ture regarding the value of pi."49 Kirsanow admits the argument 
has a bit more weight in a course on criminal justice, but either 
there is a "black" point of view on Fourth Amendment rights or 
there isn't; the Court can't have it both ways. And if "diversity" 
is really what's wanted, then why not just pick one black Democ-
rat and one black Republican, or one pro- and one anti-death 
penalty Hispanic? 
In any case, the whole argument over what whites will learn 
from the presence of a critical mass suggests that "diversity" is 
for the educational benefit of whites, as a recent graduate of the 
University of Michigan (and advocate of preferences) com-
plained to a Wall Street Journal reporter. "[I]t's offensive to stu-
dents of color," she said. "It sounds as if we're just in college to 
enrich the education of white students. 5° 
Diversity was a policy driven by the desire to look good-to 
have the "aesthetic" facade of virtue, Justice Thomas pointed 
dcnce from a national survey of campus opinion on prcfcrcncc-rclatcd issues, sec Stanley 
Rothman, S.M. Lipsct, & Neil Neville, Diversity of Affirmative Action: The State of 
Campus Opinion, 15 ACAD. QUESTIONS 52 (Fall 2002). On the question of how diversity 
relates to educational quality, sec Rothman ct. al., Does Enrollment Diversity Improve 
University Educational Quality?, 15 INT'L J. OF PUB. OPINION RES. 8 (Spring 2003) and 
Thomas E. Wood & Malcom J. Sherman, Is Campus Racial Diversity Correlated with Edu-
cational Benefits? (Apr. 4, 2001 ), available at http://www.nas.org/rcports/umich_divcrsity/ 
umich_uncorrcla tc. pdf. 
49. Peter Kirasanow, Still Unconstitlllional, NAT'L. REV. ONLINE, (Sept. 30, 2003), 
at http://www.nationalrcvicw.com/commcnt/kirasanow200309300914.asp. 
50. Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial preference Take Legal Stand Beyond 
Diversity: Society Wins with Integrated Elite, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2003, at Bl. The diver-
sity argument has had numerous critics on the political left, on and off the bench, who 
view preferences as justified primarily by ongoing societal discrimination. See, e.g., Ran-
dall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction: The Courts, the Right, and the Race Question, 14 A!\1. 
PROSPECT 49 (March 2003). See also supra notes 10 - 11 and accompanying text (the 
opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White in Bakke) and supra notes 
37, 39 & 41 and accompanying text (the opinions of Justices Ginsberg and Souter m 
Gratz and in Gruuer). 
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out (dissenting in Grutter). The school wanted "to have a certain 
appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its class-
rooms to the color of the students sitting at them.") 1 The reason 
was clear. When "our institutions engineer the visibility of black 
and brown faces," Shelby Steele has written, they erect a "fire-
wall that protects them from stigmatization as racist. "52 
The alternative to racial double standards is not all-white 
schools, it's important to remember. Asians (counted as a racial 
group by the US Census) are a powerful presence at all highly 
selective institutions of higher education. Moreover, Bowen and 
Bok calculated that approximately half the black students did 
not need racial preferences to gain admission to the selective 
schools they studied.53 
In any case, the definition of diversity used in all racial pref-
erence programs is remarkably narrow. Samuel Issacharoff, the 
Columbia University law professor who represented the Univer-
sity of Texas in the 1966 Hopwood case, is certainly a proponent 
of race-conscious admissions programs, but he won't buy the di-
versity argument. It's "not real," he has said, noting that "[n]one 
of these universities has an affirmative-action program for Chris-
tian Fundamentalists, Muslims, orthodox Jews, or any other 
group that has a distinct viewpoint. "54 Distinct viewpoints have 
never been part of the "diversity" mix. As Justice Kennedy, dis-
senting in Grutter, reported, University of Michigan law school 
faculty members were described by an admissions director as 
"'breathtakingly cynical' in deciding who would qualify as a 
member of underrepresented minorities." There was a debate on 
whether Cubans should count as Hispanics; one professor ob-
jected on the ground that they tended to be Republicans. 55 
IV 
As Roger Clegg, general counsel for the Center for Equal 
Opportunity, has noted, "[t]he scary thing about the diversity ra-
tionale is that it will always be available."56 But O'Connor's ar-
gument that a "critical mass" of "underrepresented" minorities 
51. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,355 (2003). 
52. Shelby Steele, A Victory for White Guilt, WALL ST. J., June 26,2003, at Al6. 
53. Daniel Golden, Some Backers of Racial prefermce Take Dh-ersitv Rationale 
Further, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2003, at B I. · 
54. BOWE:-o & BOK, supra note 20, at 42. 
55. 539 U.S. at393. 
56. Roger Clegg, The Vision Thing, NAT'L. REV. 0:--~u:-oE, (Mar. 25, 2(Xl3), at 
http:l/www.nationalreview.com/clegglclegg032503.asp 
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was educationally essential in fact stopped short of preferences 
today, preferences tomorrow, preferences forever. In fact, the 
point that racial double-standards were not acceptable indefi-
nitely had been made twenty-five years earlier by Justice Black-
mun, dissenting in Bakke, who expressed the "earnest hope" 
that "within a decade at most" affirmative action policies would 
be "a relic of the past."57 He was dreaming away, but the discom-
fort with permanent preferences remained on the Court. As Jus-
tice Kennedy pointed out in Grutter, if racial classifications were 
truly subject to strict scrutiny-if the constitutional standard had 
not been radically altered-then it was hard to see how the 
Court could defer to the judgment of the universities and sus-
pend that scrutiny until another, and presumably better, day.58 
O'Connor did not really answer Kennedy's unanswerable 
point. "We are mindful," she says (quoting a 1984 decision), that 
a "core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away 
with _all governmentally imposed discrimination based on 
race. "'9 It's an interesting acknowledgment that racial prefer-
ences are indeed discriminatory. "Accordingly," she goes on, 
"race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. "60 
They are "potentially ... dangerous ... ," and, as the law school 
admits, "must have reasonable durational limits. "61 Preferences, 
in other words, must be "temporary"; they must have a "termi-
nation point."62 In Bakke, it may be remembered, Justice 
Blackmun had famously said that "in order to treat some per-
sons equally, we must treat them differently."63 O'Connor, in ef-
fect, reiterated the Blackmun principle. The "acid test" of the ef-
ficacy of preferences, she declared, was their ability to eliminate 
any further need for them.64 Equal protection demands unequal 
protection-although only for a while. With Grutter, however, 
Blackmun's ten years turned into fifty. It had been a quarter of a 
century since Bakke had been decided; the Court "expect[s]," 
O'Connor wrote, "that 25 years from now, the use of racial pref-
erences will no longer be necessary .... "65 Discrimination was an 
57. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,403 (1978). 
58. 539 U.S. at393. 
59. !d. at 341. 
60. !d. at 342. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. 
63. Bakke, 438 U.S at407. 
64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. The •·acid test" notion is actually taken from Nathan-
son & Bartnik, The Constitwionality of Preferential Treatme/ll for Minority Applicants to 
Professional Schools, 58 CHI. BAR REC. 282,293 (May-June 1977). 
65. Grutler, 539 U.S. at 343. 
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anti-discrimination strategy that would last no longer than half a 
century, the Court predicted. 
v 
O'Connor's expectation of just twenty-five years more was 
one more example of the careless, disingenuous pronouncements 
that litter the history of racial preferences in higher education 
and other spheres. In the last quarter century, she said, "the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores 
has indeed increased."6 There was every reason to "expect" that 
in another quarter of a century the pool of academically high-
performing black and Hispanic applicants would have so grown 
as to make race-conscious admissions the strategy of a bygone 
era. 67 The credulous reader might believe this confident opti-
mism- this picture of preferences as nothing more than tempo-
rary medicine for a problem already fixing itself. The knowl-
edgeable reader will know that she was either scandalously 
ignorant of the real record, or deliberately and irresponsibly de-
ceptive. 
In fact, there was no empirical basis for O'Connor's faith 
that the problem of disproportionately few non-Asian minority 
students with strong academic records will have disappeared by 
2028-in any case, a depressing number of years. In the follow-
ing pages, we focus on the continuing and tragic racial gap in 
academic achievement between whites and blacks -leaving the 
story of high-performing Asians and low-performing Hispanics 
and Native Americans for another day. Preferential policies are 
primarily driven by concern over the status of blacks in Ameri-
can society, and as long as the admissions process at elite institu-
tions of higher education fails to create a "critical mass" of Afri-
can American students, schools will not abandon racial 
preferences unless compelled to do so. 
We do not mean to suggest, for a moment, that the racial 
gap cannot be closed, but only that complacent optimism is 
deeply misleading. As we argue elsewhere, closing the gap will 
take change in American public education much more radical 
than that which mainstream reformers now contemplate.68 
66. !d. at 343. 
67. !d. at 344. 
68. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAI' THER~STROM, No EXCUSES: CLOSI~G 
THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNI;-o;G (2003). 
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VI 
The best data on what American youngsters know at the 
end of high school-when they're ready to apply to Michigan 
and other selective colleges- come from the tests administered 
to random samples of students by the congressionally-mandated 
and federally-administered National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP).69 Table 1 sets forth the NAEP evidence on 
the racial gap in reading, math, and science skills among 17-year-
olds from the late 1970s (when Bakke was decided) to 1999. The 
simplest way of summarizing the complex results is by calculat-
ing the size of the racial gap in standard deviation units. If the 
difference in the mean test scores of two groups is a full standard 
deviation, the gap is huge. A full standard deviation means that 
the average student in the lower-scoring group ranks in the bot-
tom sixth of the distribution of the higher-scoring group; only 
one in six would do better than the average for the higher-
scoring group. 
Table 1 
The Black-White Gap in the NAEP Reading, Math, and Science 
Scores of 17-year-olds in Standard Deviation Units, 1977-1999. 
Reading Mathematics Science 
1980 1.19 1978 1.07 1977 1.28 
1984 0.79 1982 0.98 1982 1.25 
1988 0.55 1986 0.93 1986 1.07 
1990 0.71 1990 0.68 1990 1.04 
1992 0.86 1992 0.87 1992 1.07 
1994 0.66 1994 0.89 1994 1.08 
1996 0.69 1996 0.89 1996 1.03 
1999 0.73 1999 1.02 1999 1.18 
[Source: Calculated from the National Assessment for Education-
al Progress Data Tool, at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreporcard/ 
nepdata!) 
At the end of the 1970s, black students were woefully be-
hind whites in all three of the basic subjects tested by NAEP, 
with gaps exceeding a full standard deviation. The average black 
student had a reading score that put him or her in lOth percentile 
69. Further evidence on the magnitude of racial gap in NAEP scores is supplied in 
THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 68, at chs. 1,7, and 12. 
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of the white distribution. Only one in ten African American 17-
year-olds could read as well as the average white nearing the end 
of high school. The gap was only slightly smaller in mathematics, 
with just 13 percent of black students performing as well as the 
average white. The situation was even worse in science, with a 
mere 8 percent of African Americans scoring at or above the 
white average. 
The trend over the next decade, though, was heartening. 
The racial gap in reading narrowed especially dramatically, fal-
ling by more than half between 1980 and 1988. Progress in math 
was only a little less impressive, with the racial gap narrowing by 
more than a third. The pace of progress was slower in science, 
but the huge gap in that subject did decline by almost 20 percent 
between 1977 and 1990. 
Had these trends continued, Justice O'Connor's optimism 
might have had some foundation in fact. But they did not. Black 
students made no further progress towards parity with whites, 
and indeed fell further behind between 1988 and 1999. The mean 
reading score of African Americans had risen to the 28th percen-
tile in the white distribution by 1988, but it then fell to the 23rd 
percentile by 1999. The reversal was even sharper in math skills, 
so that black students in 1999 were doing just a shade better than 
they had 21 years earlier. African Americans made less progress 
in science than in the other two subjects, with the gap never fal-
ling below a full standard deviation. But the same regression 
took place, with the racial gap widening by 13 percent over the 
1990s. If the unfavorable trends of recent years continue, the 
University of Michigan and other elite schools will need to give 
even greater preferences to black applicants in 2028 than they 
currently do. 
Perhaps, though, it is misleading to concentrate on group 
averages. High school seniors with merely average academic 
skills rarely end up in elite law schools, or indeed in any law 
school. Suppose we look only at students at the upper end of the 
distribution, at the performance of what W.E.B. DuBois called 
"the talented tenth." An examination of the scores of the top 
tenth of black students, however, yields the same conclusions. 
On the 1980 reading assessment, blacks at the 90th percentile of 
the black distribution scored one point lower than the average 
white student in reading. By 1988, when overall black achieve-
ment hit its high point, blacks at the 90th percentile scored at the 
same level as whites at the 75th percentile. That was impressive 
progress, but the pattern reversed thereafter. By 1999, the top 
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tenth of blacks scored midway between the white 50th and 75th 
percentiles. Over a third of whites outperformed black students 
at the 90th percentile of the black distribution. 
In math, the 90th percentile of the black distribution was 
barely above the white average in 1978. By 1990 it was just a few 
points below the white 75th percentile, strong progress similar to 
that made in reading. But in 1999 the scores of blacks at 90th 
percentile had plunged, and were a mere 3 points above the 
white 50th percentile. The same pattern holds in science. In 
1999, as in 1977, black students at the 90th percentile scored a 
few points below whites at the 50th percentile. 
In sum, except in reading skills, the black talented tenth in 
1999 did not stack up any better against their white competitors 
for places at selective colleges than they had more than two dec-
ades earlier. And even in reading the racial gap remained alarm-
ingly large. 
The depressing news conveyed by the N AEP results is fur-
ther confirmed by the pattern of scores on the College Board 
SATs (Table 2). Since the SATs are taken by students who as-
pire to attend selective colleges, they provide a good sense of the 
skills of the better students coming out of high school. From the 
mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, the racial gap in SAT scores 
followed the trend indicated in the NAEP assessments: black 
students were moving ahead more rapidly than whites and catch-
ing up. The gap in both verbal and math scores dropped by 
about a quarter. 
Table 2 
Black-White Gaps in Mean SAT Scores, 1975-2000 
Verbal Math 
1976 119 139 
1981 110 121 
1987 104 112 
1991 90 104 
1996 92 101 
2000 92 104 
2003 98 108 
[Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics: 1996, NCES-96-133 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Education, 1996,) 127; 2003 and 2003 from 
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www.collegeboard.com/research/home. The recentering of the 
scores in 1995, somewhat surprisingly, seems to have had zero 
effect on the racial gap.] 
Around 1990, however, that progress came to an end. The 
dramatic regression- the marked slide downhill- that shows up 
in the NAEP data for the 1990s did not occur with SAT scores. 
Over the past few years, however, the gap has widened on the 
combined SAT scores by a modest 13 points. In the years be-
tween 1996 and 2003, the SAT verbal gap increased from .84 to 
.88 of a standard deviation, and the math gap from .90 to .94. 
While this is not an enormous change, it is significant movement 
in the wrong direction. In 2003, both gaps were a mere 6 percent 
smaller than they were back in 1981. 
The picture looks no brighter at the very top of the distribu-
tion. The combined median SAT score of students at our most 
selective colleges today is around 1400. In 1999, the top 5.5 per-
cent of whites taking the verbal SA Ts scored in the 700s, and on 
math the top 5.8 percent did 700 or better. But fewer than 1,000 
(a mere 0.76 percent) of the 119,000 black students in the nation 
who took the exams did that well on the verbal test. And only a 
little over 700 African Americans reached 700 in math, just 0.6 
percent. White students were 9.8 times as likely as their black 
peers to score 750 or better on the verbals, and 13.1 times as 
likely to do that well in math. The ratios for those scoring 700-
749 were also huge-6.2 and 8.7. 
VII 
Black students applying to college thus typically have much 
weaker academic skills than whites. And most depressingly, the 
racial gap has narrowed little over the past quarter century. 
Moreover, those who have been admitted by racial double stan-
dards do not catch up with their white and Asian classmates over 
the course of four years at a highly competitive college. Elite in-
stitutions do not provide an environment in which non-Asian 
minority students with comparatively weak test scores and high 
school grades blossom. To the contrary, they tend to perform 
worse than objective indicators predict. On the basis of studies 
conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, Robert Klitgard's classic 
Choosing Elites estimated that the GPAs of black students at the 
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top colleges were about the same as those of whites with com-
bined SAT scores 240 points lower.70 
Later evidence suggests that this is still the case. In their 
1998 brief in support of preferential admissions, The Shape of the 
River, Bowen and Bok noted the same phenomenon. The aver-
age college GP A of black students in the 28 selective schools in 
their study put them at the 23rd percentile of their classes, sig-
nificantly worse than could be predicted from their qualifications 
upon entry to the school. "The average rank in class for black 
students is appreciably lower than the average rank in class of 
white students within each SAT interval," they report. 71 Al-
though they devoted several pages to an attempt to explain this 
troubling pattern, they failed to consider one possibility: the 
relative poor performance of African American students may be 
an unanticipated cost of preferential policies. Perhaps the very 
presence of a "critical mass" of black students at these institu-
tions, most of them of them with academic skills well below the 
school's average, creates a self-segregated black subculture that 
discourages academic achievement. 
A more recent study by Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber, 
which examined samples of students from Ivy League schools, 
other leading liberal arts colleges, some large state universities, 
and a few historically black colleges, also found· sharp racial dif-
ferences in academic performance even when SAT scores were 
held constant. Interestingly, the differences were not uniform 
across institutions. They were sharpest at the most selective 
schools, a fact that they attribute in part to preferential admis-
sions that undermined the beneficiaries' academic self-
confidence.72 
We cannot be sure whether the overall racial gap narrows at 
all over four years of college because nothing like a N AEP as-
sessment exists for a representative sample of college seniors. 
But there are good grounds for doubt. Reliable information 
about the academic skills of a large subset of college seniors is 
contained in the various tests used in admissions to graduate 
schools in the arts and sciences, law, medicine, and business. 
70. ROBERT KLITGARD, CHOOSING ELITES: SELECfiNG ''THE BEST AND THE 
BRIGHTEST'' AT TOP UNIVERSITIES AND ELSEWHERE 164 (1985). 
71. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 20, at 77. For a thorough critical assessment of this 
'.\ ork. sec Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 20 (a somewhat shorter version that 
includes new mah:rial). 
72. STEPHEN COLE & ELI:-;OR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 121-27 (2[XJ3). 
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Several hundred thousand of the best and most ambitious col-
lege students each year take the Law School Admissions Test, 
the Graduate Management Admissions Test (used by business 
schools), the Graduate Records Examination, or the Medical 
College Admissions Test. 
For more than three decades, strong racial preferences in 
admissions have been in place at selective colleges large and 
small- at Dartmouth as well as Duke. These elite schools have 
made determined efforts to give "underrepresented" minority 
students the greatest possible opportunity to develop their intel-
lectual potential. If the policies had been effective, the results 
should be apparent in the size of the pool of top applicants to 
graduate school. Indeed, by now, race-conscious admissions 
should be unnecessary. 
And yet Table 3 shows that the racial gaps on all of the 
standard tests employed by graduate schools were still enormous 
in 1998, the most recent year for which we were able to obtain 
the data. Indeed, the gaps were a bit larger than those among 
students at the end of high school. The picture revealed in each 
of the eight tests reported here is almost identical: the average 
black student applying to graduate school scores in the bottom 
sixth of all test-takers. The racial gap was never less than .96 of a 
standard deviation on any of the eight tests of cognitive skills, 
and it exceeded a full standard deviation in three of the eight. 
The most selective graduate schools simply cannot admit sub-
stantial numbers of black applicants if they apply the same stan-
dards of academic achievement to members of all racial and eth-
mc groups. 
The almost complete absence of black students with creden-
tials qualifying for the most competitive law schools is illustrated 
by the data on LSA T scores and college grades that were pre-
sented bl the Law School Admissions Council in its brief in 
Grutter.7 (The Law School Admissions Council has not been 
eager to release information about this sensitive subject, but its 
brief in Grutter, while written in support of preferences, con-
tained devastating information, underscoring the magnitude of 
the racial gap and the racial double-standards used in sifting 
through applicants as a result.) In 2002, a total of 4,461 appli-
cants to American law schools had LSAT scores of 165 or better 
and college GPAs of at least 3.5. Only 29 of the 4,461 were 
73. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law School Admissions Council in Support of Respon-
dents at8-9, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
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black, 0.65 percent of the total. The 14 highest-ranked law 
schools (ranging from Yale to Georgetown) all have median 
LSAT scores above 165 and median GPAS above 3.5. If the 29 
black students with academic credentials comparable to those of 
their average student were apportioned among them, that would 
work out to be just two in the first-year class at each school. 
Finding that unacceptable, our law schools have chosen to lower 
the bar in evaluating black applicants. 
Table 3 
The Black-White Gap on Various Achievement Tests at Two 
Key Transitional Points, in Standard Deviation Units 
End of high school 
NAAP reading, 1999 0.73 
SAT verbal, 2003 0.88 
NAEP math, 1999 1.02 
SAT math, 2003 1.0. 
NAEP science, 1999 1.18 
End of college 
LSAT, 1998 
GMAT,1998 
GRE verbal, 1998 
GRE quantitative, 1998 
GRE analytical, 1998 
MCA T verbal, 1998 
1.08 
1.03 
0.96 
0.98 
1.11 
0.96 
MCAT physical science, 1998 0.96 
MCAT biological science, 1998 0.96 
[Source: NAEP figures from Table 1 above. SAT gap calcu-
lated from College Entrance Examination Board, 2003 College-
Bound Seniors: A Profile of SAT Program Test Takers (New 
York: College Board, 2003), Tables 4.1 and 6. All others as given 
in Wayne J. Camara and Amy Elizabeth Schmidt, Group Differ-
ences in Standardized Testing and Social Strarification, College 
Board Report No. 99-5, New York: College Entrance Examina-
tion Board, 1999), Table 1.] 
For comparative purposes, in order to gauge the trends, the 
only data we have are for the years 1997-2002-from the same 
Grutter brief. For that five year period, the figures fluctuate only 
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slightly, and there is no consistent upward trend. In fact, the 2002 
figure was below that for both 1998 and 2000-the percentage of 
black high scorers being 0.69 and 0.73, respectively. O'Connor 
described a closing racial gap; she was ignoring the Law School 
Admissions Council's own numbers. 
How well do relatively poorly prepared, preferentially-
admitted students do in law school and beyond? Writing in this 
journal in 1998, one of us presented an intensive analysis of the 
available data on students beginning their professional education 
in the Fall of 1991.74 The results were not encouraging. Of the 
black students admitted as a consequence of the weight given to 
their racial identity, 22 percent dropped out before graduation.75 
The bar exam was of course another hurdle, and here again, 
the news was not good: 27 percent of those who did graduate 
were unable to pass within three years of leaving law school.76 
Many of these students had not only devoted three years to pre-
paring themselves for a profession, but were deeply in debt as a 
consequence. Of all the beneficiaries of law school admissions 
preferences in 1991, 43 percent failed to clear both hurdles-
obviously a dismayingly large number. These are figures for only 
one group of students; we do not have trend data to draw a fuller 
picture. It's unlikely, however, that 1991 was an anomalous year. 
If it is at all representative, with no or little positive change over 
time- in keeping with LSA T and other scores- there is no rea-
son to believe preferences will have melted away by 2028. In-
deed, there may be grounds to worry that, under political pres-
sure, the grading of bar exams will also become race-conscious. 
One standard for whites and Asians, another for "underrepre-
sented" minorities.77 And then, with the compelling need for 
"diversity" as a justification, would O'Connor find different 
74. Stephan Thernstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical 
Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education," !5 
CONST. COMMENT. II (1998). 
75. !d. at 29. 
76. !d. at 36. 
77. It is revealing that recent proposals to raise the passing score on both the Flor-
ida and New York bar exams have been strenuously resisted on the grounds that tighten-
ing standards would have a disparate impact on blacks; Laurie Cunningham, Raising the 
Bar, BROWARD DAILY BUSII'ESS REV., March 26,2003, all; Committee on Legal Edu-
cation and Admission to the Bar, In Opposition to the Board of Law Examiners' Pro-
posal to Increase the Passing Score on the New York Bar Examination, 58 THE REC. OF 
THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 97-120 (2003) (if preferential poli-
Cies make law school a "level playing field," why should tightening the standards on the 
bar exams have a disparate impact upon black candidates for the bar?). 
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passing scores for different races a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause? 
VIII 
In the history of judicial decisions involving racial prefer-
ences in education and other spheres, O'Connor's attempt at re-
assurance-just twenty-five years more, folks-is arguably the 
low point in a shocking history of transparently absurd argu-
ments. Ignoring widely available facts, she painted a rosy land-
scape when the truth is close to catastrophic. It is criminal to of-
fer complacent optimism about the racial gap in academic 
achievement. Her majority opinion is a cover-up. The racial gap 
in academic achievement is the most important source of ongo-
ing racial inequality. Those who care about the persistence of 
that inequality will not engage in such duplicity. Instead, they 
will say loud and clear, America must get its educational act to-
gether. A racially-identifiable group of educational have-nots is 
morally unacceptable. This is a problem that can be fixed. 78 
Race has been called the "American dilemma." It is, in fact, 
the American undoing-the ground on which we lose our foot-
ing, the problem that plays havoc with bedrock American values. 
Racial classifications in the United States have a long and ugly 
history; racial subordination was all about double standards, with 
different entitlements depending on your racial identity. Never-
theless, the highest court in the land has now embraced them 
with slipshod, slapdash, reckless, and obfuscating arguments. It is 
a bleak day in American constitutional law. 
"Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their 
color, I share, in some respect, the sympathies of those who 
sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the University of 
Michigan Law School," Justice Thomas wrote, dissenting in 
Grutter.79 Who would disagree? The numbers are painful; the 
desire for a quick fix understandable. But, as Thomas went on to 
say, "[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on 
race .... "80 They demean us all-especially, he could have 
added, when built on foundation of appalling indifference to 
facts, logic, and principle. 
78. See THERI"STRO~ & THERNSTROM, supra note 68 passim. 
79. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003). 
80. /d. at 353. 
